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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction under U.C.A.§78-2-2(3)(j); the
Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §
78-2-2(4).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The trial court's summary judgment ruling presents the following issues on appeal:
a.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the plaintiffs real estate agent acted
within her actual/implied or apparent authority when she instructed the
defendant Equity Title Insurance Agency, Inc., to close plaintiffs land sale.

b.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled defendant Equity Title Insurance
Agency, Inc met its fiduciary duties to plaintiff when its escrow agent, absent
written authorization, closed plaintiffs sale without the surety bond required
under the terms of the real estate purchase contract.

The standard of review for both issues is correctness: An appellate court reviews a
grant of summary judgment without deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, and
considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party. The reviewing
court affirms only where there is no genuine dispute as to material issues of fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wycalis v. Guardian Title of
Utah, 780 P. 2d 821, 824 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
These issues were reserved for appeal because the appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal (R. 628-630) following the trial court's entry of a minute order on May
24, 2005 granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant/Appellee Equity Title
Insurance Agency, Inc. and defendant Independence Title Insurance Agency.
Addendum 1.

1

DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following state statute and administrative rule are of central importance in
this appeal:
U.C.A. § 25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of
any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is
to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
U.A.C.A. R162-6-1. Licensee Conduct.
6.1.11.1. A principal broker and licencees acting on his behalf who represent a
seller shall have a written agency agreement with the seller defining the scope of the
agency.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The complaint in this case was filed on January 31, 2004, in Third District Court
in Salt Lake City, against Equity Title Insurance Agency, Inc. (Equity) and Independence
Title Insurance Agency (Independence). R. 1-23. (Complaint). The complaint alleged
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and breach of contract against the defendants for
closing Posner's land sale without the surety bond required by his Real Estate Purchase
Contract, thereby effecting a sale to an unqualified buyer. R. 7-10.
On February 9, 2004, Independence filed a Motion and Memorandum to dismiss.
R. 24-26, R. 27-32. On February 25, plaintiff filed its Memorandum in Opposition to
Independence's Motion to Dismiss (R. 39-44), and Independence filed its Reply on
February 27. R. 48-55. The trial court denied Independence's motion to dismiss on May
10, 2004. R. 75.
On March 3, 2004, Equity filed its Answer to plaintiffs complaint. R.56-66. On
December 22, 2004, the plaintiff moved to amend its first complaint in order to add a
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third defendant, NRT, Inc., a New Jersey corporation doing business in Utah as Coldweli
Banker Residential Brokerage (hereinafter Coldweli). R. 119-120. The trial court granted
permission to amend on February 7, 2005 (R.165), and on March 28, Posner filed a First
Amended Complaint in which he added Coldweli as a third defendant and dropped the
breach of contract claims against defendants. R. 323-336.
On March 28 and 29 respectively, Equity and Independence filed Motions and
Memoranda in support of summary judgment. R.258-322 (Equity), R. 337-418
(Independence). Posner filed a Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment on April 14.
R. 455-545. Defendants filed Reply Memoranda in Support of Summary Judgment on
April 15 (Independence R. 546-566) and April 22 (Equity 594-601). On May 24, 2005
the Court granted summary judgment to Equity and Independence. Addendum 1. Posner
filed a timely notice of appeal of the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to
Equity on June 20. R. 628-630. Posner did not appeal the Court's dismissal of his claim
against Independence. Mr. Posner and Coldweli Banker jointly requested, and were
granted, a stay of proceedings pending the outcome of this appeal. R. 635-637.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the summer of 2002, Michael Posner retained Coldweli Banker Residential
Brokerage to list two lots he owned in Deer Valley, and hired Coldweli real estate agent
Kandis Christoffersen. R. 274,^'s 12, 13 (First Amended Complaint). In July, Posner
negotiated a sale of his land for a purchase price of $450,000 (R.287, Posner's Real
Estate Purchase Contract), agreeing to provide $260,000 in seller financing. Addendum
3. To ensure that he would receive payment in full, Posner inserted a condition in his

3

Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) that required the buyer, Chris Strachan, to supply
a surety bond in the same amount as his seller financing. Addendum 4, Addendum 5.
Posner retained Equity Title Insurance Agency, Inc. as his title company. R. 16 (Posner's
Settlement Statement). The buyer hired Independence Title Insurance Agency of Salt
Lake City as his title company. R.79. (Answer of Independence).
On or about August 23, Posner signed closing papers, left them with Equity to
complete the closing, and returned to his residence in Florida. R. 362, p. 34, Ins. 1-4
(Posner Deposition). He did not give any written authorization to Kandis Christoffersen
or anyone at Equity to make changes on his behalf. R. 481-483, ^j's 3,11,12. (Posner
Affidavit) On or about August 28, Strachan closed with Independence. R. 21 (Buyer's
Settlement Statement). At closing Strachan supplied a document entitled "Financial
Guarantee" (the Guarantee) for $260,000 (Addendum 2), and requested that Posner add
$3,900 to the seller financing amount. Posner approved the $3,900 increase to his seller
financing from his residence in Florida by fax and in writing (Addendum 3),1 but was
never informed that the buyer had supplied a so-called "Financial Guarantee" for
$260,000 rather than a surety bond for the full amount of the seller financing ($263,900).
R. 483, t 14 (Posner's Affidavit).
Equity closed Posner's sale when Kandis Christoffersen verbally instructed
Equity escrow agent Helen Smith that Posner had seen and approved the Guarantee and
said to close. R. 263-264, f s l-4(Equity's Statement of Undisputed Facts). Equity does
not allege that it closed the sale with the signature of Posner or Kandis Christoffersen

1

See also R. 16, line 206 (Posner's Settlement Statement)
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approving the change from a $263,900 surety bond to a $260,000 Financial Guarantee. R.
263-264, f s 1-4 (Equity's Statement of Undisputed Facts). See also Addendum 3. 2
Subsequently, Strachan never made a payment on the land. When Posner learned
of Strachan's default in November of 2002, he attempted to collect on the Financial
Guarantee but it proved worthless. R. 329, <[| 31 (First Amended Complaint). To mitigate
his damages, Posner bought back his land in June of 2003 for approximately $120,000
more than he had received at the time of closing. R 334, f 37(First Amended Complaint).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Posner alleges negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against Equity for closing
his land sale with a "Financial Guarantee" rather than the "surety bond" his REPC
required. In granting summary judgment to Equity, the trial court ruled that (1) real
estate agent Kandis Christoffersen's instructions to Equity to close fell within the scope
of "her actual implied and/or apparent authority" as Posner's real estate agent and (2) that
Equity breached no duty to Posner. Addendum 1.
The trial court erred in finding that Christoffersen's verbal instructions provided a
basis for Equity to close, as changes to Posner's REPC required his written approval.3 In
this case, Christoffersen's instruction to close with the $260,000 Financial Guarantee
changed the contract in two respects: (1) it allowed closing to occur without a valid
2

Addendum 3 is the page of Posner's REPC on which he crossed out the figure of $260,000, wrote in
$263,900 and initialed approval of this new amount of seller financing early on the morning of August 30,
2002. This page contains the requirement "surety bond will be issued in the amount above before close";
but no further modifications by Posner appear on this page.
3
Three days prior to the hearing on summary judgment, counsel for Posner informed the trial court via
letter and defendants via email and letter, that she intended to rely on the Statute of Frauds and Posner's
REPC. This letter does not appear in the official record; however, the transcript from the summary
judgment hearing confirms that Judge Medley and Equity received notice: (R. 644, p. 16-20; p. 32-34). At
the conclusion of oral argument, the trial court gave the defendants a week to brief this point of law. R.
644, p. 28 and pp. 35-36. Defendants declined to brief this point. R. 644, p. 36.
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"surety bond"; and (2) it altered the amount of seller financing from $263,900 to
$260,000. See Addenda 2-5.
U.C.A. §25-5-3, case law and the terms of Posner's REPC require changes to a
real estate contract to be made in writing by either a party to the contract, or his
authorized agent. Golden Key Realty v. Mantas, 699 P. 2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985), Zion 's
Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P. 2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975); Coombs v. Ouzounian, 465 P.
2d 356, 358 (Utah 1970). When she instructed Equity to close, Christoffersen possessed
neither Posner's written approval of the Guarantee nor written authorization to act in his
place. Equity's summary judgment motion provided no evidence that anyone—Posner or
Christoffersen—approved the Financial Guarantee in writing. R.258-322, R. 594-601
(Equity's Memorandum and Reply in Support of Summary Judgment). Accordingly, the
trial court's ruling that Christoffersen acted within her authority is incorrect as a matter of
law.
In addition, the trial court plainly erred in ruling that Equity's evidence met the
threshold requirements for actual, implied or apparent authority. For example, the scope
of a real estate agent's authority must be set forth in writing.4 Equity's evidence that
Christoffersen had actual/implied authority, however, consists solely of deposition
testimony. As Equity has not offered the agency contract between Posner and
Christoffersen into evidence (R. 263-264, Undisputed Facts, Equity's Summary
Judgment Memorandum), and Posner denies that his agency contract contained such
authority (R.481, % 12 (Posner Affidavit), there is no proper basis for finding that
Christoffersen acted within her actual authority.

4

Utah Admin. Code Rl 62-6-1(6.1.11.1.).
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Equity's argument in support of apparent authority is also deficient; its evidence
fails to establish that Posner's conduct caused Equity's escrow agent to believe that
Christoffersen could change Posner's contract without written authorization. In fact,
Smith admitted that she knew she needed Posner's, not Christoffersen's, approval to
close with the Financial Guarantee. R. 525, Ins. 20-25, R. 526, R. 527, Ins. 1-4. (Smith
Deposition). See City Elec. V. Dean Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P. 2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983):
".. .apparent authority vanishes when the third party has actual knowledge of the real
scope of the agent's authority."
For these reasons, the trial court's ruling that Christoffersen acted within her
authority should be reversed. If the trial court's ruling on Christoffersen's authority is
reversed, then the second ruling that Equity breached no duty must also be reversed, as
Equity has offered no other undisputed facts or points of law to substantiate this ruling.
ARGUMENT
A. The Trial Court's ruling violates the Utah Statute of Frauds and Posner's
REPC.
The trial court's conclusion that Kandis Christoffersen acted within her authority
disregards the fundamental requirement that changes to a real estate contract must be in
writing. Utah's Statute of Frauds U.C.A. § 25-5-3 states in pertinent part:
Every contract .. .for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the
party by whom the sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in
writing.
When the law requires a contract to be in writing, any changes to the contract
must also be made in writing. See Golden Key Realty v. Mantas, 699 P. 2d 730, 732
(Utah 1985), Zion'sProperties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P. 2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975); Coombs
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v. Ouzounian, 465 P. 2d 356, 358 (Utah 1970). See also § 301 STATUTE OF FRAUDS 72
Am. Jur. 2d: Generally, a contract for the exchange of lands entered into by an agent
under verbal authority cannot be enforced where the Statute of Frauds requires the
authority of the agent.. .to be in writing. Consistent with U.C.A. § 25-5-3, Posner's
REPC also required that all changes "must be made in writing by the Parties to the
contract". Addendum 6
The Statute of Frauds applies to Posner's land sale; therefore, his real estate
contract, and any changes to it, had to be in writing. Indeed, since applicable law as well
as the REPC required Posner's written authorization to change the contract terms, his real
estate agent, under any theory of authority, certainly could not make changes verbally.
To decide differently not only defeats the purpose of the Statute Frauds but also gives an
agent more legal power than her principal possessed at the outset.
At closing, Posner's REPC was materially changed without his written
authorization: Posner authorized $263,900 in seller financing, and his REPC specifically
required "a surety bond in the same amount" as the seller financing. Equity accepted a
Financial Guarantee that departed from this REPC requirement in two ways: it was
designated "Financial Guarantee", rather than "surety bond" 5 and it was written for
$3,900 less than the REPC required.6 When Equity closed with the Guarantee, it

5

Significantly, the trial court considered whether "Financial Guarantee" and "Surety bond" were
synonymous terms in Independence's Motion to Dismiss (R 27-32) and its Reply Memorandum. R. 48-55
The Court declined to make a final determination on this point and denied Independence's motion. R. 75.
6
Under Utah law, a "surety bond" must be issued by a licensed insurance company authorized by the state
insurance department, see U.C.A. § 31A -22-103, and must comply with minimum capital or surplus
requirements set by the state: U.C.A. § 31 A-5-211. Posner claims the Financial Guarantee was not a surety
bond. R. 39-43. (Posner's Memorandum in Response to 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss).
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accepted a document that materially departed from the terms of Posner's REPC without
his written approval.7
Posner's written authorization (or written approval from an agent authorized by
Posner in writing) was a necessary prerequisite to closing with the Guarantee rather than
a $263,900 surety bond. Significantly, even if Posner had approved the Guarantee, his
signature was still necessary. Equity has never supplied written authorization approving
the Guarantee as grounds for Kandis Christoffersen's authority (R. 263, R. 598), yet this
is the only proper basis for finding that Christoffersen had authority to change the
contract. The trial court's ruling that Christoffersen acted within her authority is therefore
incorrect. This point alone provides the reviewing the Court with sufficient grounds for
reversing the trial court's decision on Christoffersen's authority: "Summary judgment is
appropriate only when.. .the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hill
v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, 1275 (Utah 2001); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

B. The Trial Court erred in ruling that Kandis Christoffersen acted within the
scope of her actual implied and/or apparent authority.
Even if the Utah Statute of Frauds is not controlling on the issue of
Christoffersen's authority, reversal is still warranted because 1) Equity's evidence of
Christoffersen's actual or implied authority is legally insufficient, and 2) Equity's
evidence does not satisfy threshold requirements for finding apparent authority.

7

Given Equity's failure to present either evidence or argument refuting Posner's claim that his REPC was
breached, and consistent with the requirement to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, Posner's claim that a breach occurred must be taken as true for the purposes of this
appeal. See Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d 72, 75 (Utah 2003): in reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, [the reviewing court must] view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
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a. Actual Authority
Actual authority encompasses both express and implied authority. Zion 's First
National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P. 2d 1090, 1994, (Utah 1988). In support of
its claim that Christoffersen had express authority, Equity relies (R. 266) on the general
rule that "Express authority exists where the principal directly states that an agent has the
authority to perform a particular act on the principal's behalf." (emphasis added) Id.,
(additional cites omitted). The sole basis of Equity's claim that Christoffersen had
express authority is deposition testimony by Posner:
The only reason that Kandis was at my closing was to get her commission. And
my contact with her as being I guess my agent was to make sure that it closed. And she
was the one negotiating back and forth with the contract [the REPC] as far as making
sure that we had surety bond and how much it was and everything else. R. 267
In this quote Posner describes what he thought Christoffersen was doing at his
closing. This statement does not trump other deposition testimony Posner has cited as
proof that he did not authorize Christoffersen.9 R. 467. (Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition to Equity's Summary Judgment Motion) Indeed, Posner's explicit denial that
he granted Christoffersen express authority in and of itself raises a factual issue
mandating rejection of summary judgment. See R. 483, Tf's 11, 12. (Posner's Affidavit)
Moreover, as a matter of law, Equity's reliance on such verbal evidence is
inapposite: in Utah, a real estate agent's express authority must be put in writing. Utah
Admin. Code, Rule 162-6-1(6.1.11.1) (1993) l0 requires that the scope of a real estate

Nor is it clear that the second sentence of this quotation refers to Christoffersen's role at closing, rather
than to her role as a conduit for negotiations between Posner and Strachan regarding the original
requirement of the surety bond.
9
Both quotes are retrospective commentaries uttered more than two years after Posner's closing; as such,
neither constitutes direct evidence of a statement Posner made, prior to his closing, expressly authorizing
Christoffersen to act for him at his closing.
10
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 61-2-5.5, creating a Real Estate Commission authorized to make administrative
rules, Utah Admin. Code Rule 162-6-1(6.1.11.1) (1993) of the Division of Real Estate, Utah Department of
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agent's authority be defined in a written agency agreement. The written agency
agreement between Posner and Coldwell Banker was Posner's listing agreement. R. 301,
Ins. 4-9. (Christoffersen Deposition); R. 468. (Posner's Memorandum Opposing
Summary Judgment).
A listing agreement does not grant broad or general powers to a real estate agent,
but commonly confers to a brokerage the right to find a buyer for the vendor and to
receive a commission, §13.02(b)(1), § 13.02(b)(1)(f). Realtor Agreements; Commissions.
UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW, 1999. See also Pilling v. Eastern and Pacific Enterprises
Trust, 702 P. d 1232, 1237 (Wash. App. 1985): (The scope of the agency between the
seller and the broker is defined by the agent's purpose, which is to find a purchaser.);
Painter v. Huke, 862 P. 2d 566, 568 (Ore. App. 1993): (listing agreement authorizing
broker to sell vendor's property "at the selling price and on the terms noted" did not
provide express or implied authority to agent to accept a buyer's offer on terms different
than those specified in the contract).
In particular, a listing agreement does not authorize real estate agents to transact
transfers of real property on behalf of their principals. See Frandsden v. Gerstner, 487 P.
2d 697,700 (Utah 1971): (A listing agreement empowering the realtor to find a buyer
does not authorize the broker in writing to execute a contract of sale on behalf of his
principal: "Thus the authority of a real estate broker with whom lands are listed for sale
does not extend to the signing of a contract for sale. The power to execute a contract of

Commerce requires a principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who represent a seller to "have a
written agency agreement with the seller defining the scope of the agency."
11
Cf. Baumgartner v. Burt, 365 P. 2d 681, 682(Colo. 1961): The relationship between an agent and his
principal is a contractual one and the extent of the rights and duties of each is to be found in the express or
implied terms of the agency contract.
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sale is an additional authority that must be expressly granted in writing." citing Queen
City Lumber Co. v. Fisher, 111 N.W. 2d 714, 716 (N.D. 1961).
Posner claims that he expressly authorized Christoffersen to help find a buyer for his
land and nothing more. R.481, ^j's 3, 11, 12 (Posner Affidavit). Equity has not refuted
Posner's position with proof that Christoffersen's written contract of agency included the
power to negotiate his sales terms and sign in place of him, nor explained how an
expressly delegated power to find a buyer for Posner transformed into the far broader
authority to act in Posner's place and approve a Financial Guarantee in place of a "surety
bond." R. 261-322 and R. 594-601. (Equity's Memorandum and Reply Memorandum in
Support of Summary Judgment).
By law, Christoffersen's express authority must be written, yet Equity's evidence
of her express authority is deposition testimony. The trial court's finding that express
authority existed is incorrect, as it is not based on a written document establishing such
authority. At present the record contains nothing more than conflicting testimony on this
matter and summary judgment is not appropriate. Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70
P.3d 72,75 (Utah 2003) (Summary judgment only appropriate where there are no
disputed issues of material fact).

Equity also urges that Christoffersen had actual authority under the doctrine of
implied authority. When an agent is given express authority, he acquires, by implication,
the implied authority to do all that is necessary to exercise the authority expressly
granted. Thus an agent has implied authority if his conduct fell within the scope of, or
was incidental, necessary, usual or proper to, the main authority delegated. Diston v.
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Enviropak Med. Products, Inc., 893 P. 2d 1071, 1076 (Utah App. 1995). An analysis of
actual authority, whether express or implied, focuses on the acts of the principal from the
agent's perspective. Id.
In support of its claim that Christoffersen had implied authority, Equity states that
Ms. Christoffersen was Posner's "listing agent." R. 266, R. 288. As set forth above,
however, the only express authority a listing agreement gives is authority to help the
seller find a buyer. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Christoffersen herself did not
believe she had such implied authority at closing, as she took steps to obtain Posner's
written authorization of the new amount of seller financing. R. 3045, Ins. 2-18.
In giving verbal instructions to close with a document that materially breached
the terms of Posner's REPC without Posner's written authorization, Christoffersen acted
without authority. Approving a change in the type of financial security required for
seller financing was no more "incidental, necessary or proper" to the authority Posner
delegated to assist in finding a buyer than was approving a change in the amount of seller
financing, for these unauthorized verbal instructions effectively altered the terms of
Posner's agreement and ultimately thwarted the very purpose for which Christoffersen
was hired. Christoffersen's conduct violated basic requirements under the Statute of
Frauds and Posner's REPC that changes to his contract be made in writing, as well as
fiduciary duties that she owed to Posner12. Therefore, Equity's argument that
Christoffersen had implied authority is unfounded in law.

12

Pursuant to U.C.A. § 61-2-5.5 and 61-2-11, Christoffersen's conduct must conform to professional
standards articulated in the Administrative Rules of the Division of Real Estate, Utah Department of
Commerce. These standards include the prescription that that principal broker and licensees acting on his
behalf owe to their principal fiduciary duties of care including full disclosure Utah Admin. Code R162-62(1998) (6.2.15.1.(c)) and reasonable care and diligence 6.2.15. l.(e).
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b. Apparent Authority
"Apparent authority exists: 'where a person has created such an appearance of
things that it causes a third party reasonably and prudently to believe that a second party
has the power to act on behalf of the first person . . . . ' " (emphasis added) Walker Bank &
Trust Company v. Jones, 672 P. 2d 73,75 (Utah 1983). An analysis of apparent authority
must focus on the acts of the principal from a third party's perspective. Diston v.
Enviropak Med. Products, Inc., 893 P. 2d 1071,1076 (Utah App. 1995). As applied to this
case, Christoffersen had apparent authority if the evidence shows that Posner's conduct
led Equity reasonably and prudently to believe that Christoffersen could give verbal
instructions that substantially changed her principal's REPC without his written
authorization. Equity's evidence of Posner's conduct fails to meet this threshold
requirement.
Equity urges that Christoffersen had apparent authority because "listing
Christoffersen as his agent on the REPC, using her to negotiate the contract, delegating to
her the responsibility of 'making sure that we had a surety bond and how much it was and
everything else'" created the appearance of apparent authority. R. 267-268 (Equity's
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment). Merely hiring a real estate agent to sell
land and noting this on the REPC is not sufficient conduct on Posner's part to create the
appearance that Christoffersen had authority to change Posner's REPC without his
written approval. Under general principles of agency law, a real estate agent is deemed to
be a special agent acting under a limited power, rather than a general agent, and has the
power to do only those acts specifically named in the contract of agency, (emphasis
added) 3 Am. Jur. 2d §122 AGENCY; 12 Am Jur. 2d §88 BROKERS (See also Martin v.
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Vincent^ 593 P. 2d 45, (Mont. 1979) (A real estate broker does not have general authority
and is only authorized to do what is specifically assigned in his contract).
The record plainly establishes that Smith understood that Christoffersen's agency
was limited rather than general. None of Smith's actions indicate that she believed that
Christoffersen possessed authority beyond helping Posner find a buyer and sell his land.
On the contrary, Smith stated in her deposition that she did not believe Christoffersen had
the authority to replace Posner and stated that she believed she needed Posner's approval
to proceed to close. R. 525-527. (Smith Deposition). Smith testified that Posner told her
his attorney had approved the Guarantee, again showing lack of reliance on any authority
possessed by Christoffersen.13 R. 531, Ins. 14-25 (Smith Deposition). Christoffersen had
openly told Posner, in Helen Smith's presence, that she had no idea what a surety bond
was. R. 544, Ins. 13-18. (Christoffersen Deposition). Smith's decision to accept
Christoffersen's verbal representations regarding Posner's wishes, when the documents
before her plainly deviated from the express terms of Posner's REPC, signals her own
misjudgment, not evidence of her belief in Christoffersen's apparent authority.
Furthermore, apparent authority cannot be invoked by one who knows or has
good reason to know the limits and extent of an agent's authority. 3 Am. Jur. 2d § 78.
See Ellis v. Nelson, 233 P.2d 1072,1075 (Nev.1951):
.. .there can be reliance only upon what the principal himself has said or done, or
at least said or done through some other and authorized agent. The acts of the agent in
question can not be relied upon as alone enough to support an estoppel. If his acts are
relied upon there must also be evidence of the principal's knowledge and acquiescence in
them. Moreover, in any case, the reliance must have been a reasonable one, consistent
with the exercise of reasonable prudence, and the party who claims reliance must not
have closed his eyes to warning or inconsistent circumstances, (emphasis added).
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Posner's attorney supplied an affidavit stating he never saw the Financial Guarantee prior to closing.
R. 587, | 1 1 . (Affidavit of Scott Poston).
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Utah cases uphold this limitation: See Bodell Construction Company v. Stewart
Title Guaranty Company, 945 P. 2d 119, 124 (Utah App. 1997); City Elec. V. Dean
Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P. 2d 89,90 (Utah 1983); Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P. 2d 74,
78 (Utah 1982), citing Dohrmann Hotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummel, Inc., 103 P. 2d 650,
651 (Utah 1940): one who deals with an agent has the responsibility to ascertain the
agent's authority despite the agent's representations. Reliance on apparent authority is
also not justified where it is inconsistent with the circumstances of the transaction. 3 Am.
Jur. 2d § 78 AGENCY Simpson v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 248 N.E. 2d. 117,
120 (111. 1969). The mere fact that Smith chose to rely on Christoffersen is not itself
evidence of Christoffersen's authority.14
On the facts of this case, Helen Smith knew or had good reason to know Kandis
Christoffersen did not have the authority to change Posner's REPC without written
approval. Helen Smith was not an uninformed third party in this transaction but an
escrow agent. R. 519, Ins. 5-21 (Smith Deposition) with a fiduciary duty15 to Posner. The
record plainly establishes that Ms. Smith understood that Posner's REPC functioned as
her escrow instructions (R. 519, Ins. 7-12, Smith Deposition) and that she knew Posner's
closing documents needed to meet the terms of his REPC. R. 520, lines 15-20. (Smith
Deposition). As an escrow agent bound to follow the terms of the REPC, Smith knew or
should have known that Posner's signature was required to approve a change in his
REPC. Addendum 6. Thus it was neither prudent nor reasonable for Smith to rely on
verbal instructions from Christoffersen. Equity's assertion of apparent authority is an
attempt to escape liability for its agent's failure to act to protect Posner's interests simply
14

"Authority is not 'apparent' simply because the party claiming has acted upon his conclusions." Tsouras
v. Southwest Plumbing and Heating, 587 P. 2d 1321, 1323 (Nev. 1978).
15
Freegard v. First Western National Bank, 738 P. 2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987)
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by contacting him directly. None of the evidence supplied in Equity's motion for
summary judgment can correctly be construed as sufficient in law to support a finding of
apparent authority.
C. The Trial Court's conclusion that Equity breached no duty to Posner should be
reversed
In Utah, escrow agents owe a fiduciary duty of care to the parties to an escrow. In
Freegardv. First Western National Bank, 738 P. 2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court noted "it is well established that an escrow agent assumes the role of the
agent of both parties to the transaction, and as such, a fiduciary is held to a high standard
of care in dealing with its principals." See also New West Federal Savings and Loan
Assoc, v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 818 P. 2d 585, 589 (1991 Utah App.); Hertz
v. Nordic Limited, Inc., 761 P. 2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1988).16
Although an escrow agent's fiduciary duty may vary somewhat according to
jurisdiction, courts agree that the core of the escrow agent's fiduciary duty is to follow
the escrow instructions. See, e.g., Schoepe v. Zion 's First National Bank, 750 F. Supp.
1084, 1088, (D. Utah 1990), (noting Utah courts have endorsed the principle that "the
scope of the escrow agent's duty is governed by the escrow agreement, and includes, at
minimum, an obligation to exercise reasonable skill and ordinary diligence in following
the escrow instructions." (Additional cites omitted)
In the instant case, Posner's escrow agent, Helen Smith, closed his sale with a
document that, in both name and amount, did not match the specific requirements of the
This principle is recognized in other jurisdictions as well: The escrow agent must strictly
comply with the instructions of the principals. See, e.g., Manley v. Ticor, 798 P. 2d 1327, 1331 (Az. Ct.
App 1989): "[H]e must conduct the affairs with which he is entrusted with scrupulous honesty, skill, and
diligence." National Bank ofWashington v. Equity Investors, 506 P. 2d 20, 35 (Wash. 1973).
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REPC terms. Despite the notable discrepancies between the REPC terms and the
Guarantee, and despite the fact that Smith was an agent who owed a fiduciary duty of
care to Posner, Equity's phone records show no fax to Posner's residence in Florida prior
to his closing. R. 461; R. 504-515. As alleged in the Equity's summary judgment motion,
the sole foundation upon which Ms. Smith based her decision to close was that Posner's
real estate agent told her that Posner had approved the Guarantee and said that closing
could occur. Ms. Smith closed without requesting or receiving written authorization of
the Guarantee from Mr. Posner.
Ms. Christoffersen's verbal instructions in closing Posner's sale were not a legally
sufficient basis for Ms. Smith to close Posner's sale. As set forth previously, to verify
that she had Mr. Posner's actual knowledge and approval of the Guarantee, as well as
comply with her professional obligations to disclose relevant information in a diligent
manner, Ms. Christoffersen was required to obtain Posner's signature approving the
Guarantee. Measured by either the law governing real estate transactions or the
professional standards of the real estate business, nothing short of a signature was a
sufficient basis for Ms. Christoffersen, in Utah, to conclude that Posner, in Florida, had
seen and approved the Guarantee.
As set forth previously, the evidence plainly establishes that Smith knew she was
obliged to follow the terms of Posner's REPC, and therefore should have known that
Posner's signature was required to approve a change in his REPC. Addendum 6. To
verify that Christoffersen's instructions were proper and accurate, Smith should have
either insisted that Christoffersen supply Posner's written approval of the Financial
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Guarantee, or else obtained it herself. There is thus no proper basis for concluding that
Smith was entitled to rely on Christoffersen's verbal instructions.
Appellee's motion for summary judgment depends, in its entirety, on the
assertion that it was justified in relying on Christoffersen's authority, whether
actual/implied or apparent. R. 263, 268. If Equity's argument regarding Christoffersen's
authority is incorrect, then there is no basis in fact or law to refute Posner's claims of
fiduciary breach. Therefore, if the trial court's ruling on Christoffersen's authority is
reversed, its finding of no fiduciary breach must also be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons put forth above, Appellant respectfully requests this Court to
confirm that Posner's written approval of the Guarantee was required by law and to
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on this basis, remanding for further
proceedings consistent with this ruling. In addition or in the alternative, Appellant
requests the Court to find Equity's evidence of Christoffersen's authority insufficient as a
matter of law, reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment on this basis and
remanding for proceedings consistent with this ruling.

Dated this

day of November, 2005.

G&

Catherine James
Michael Goldsmith
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Michael C. Posner
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I hereby certify that on this ^ y day of November 2005,1 delivered two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT (Appellate Case No.
20050556-CA) to:
David Bennion
Parsons Behle & Latimer
One Utah Center
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Appellee
I certify that on this ^ a day of November 2005,1 sent two true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT (Appellate Case No. 20050556-CA)
via U.S. first class pre-paid mail to the following:
Dave Overholt
Robert Ponte
RICHER & OVERHOLT
901 West Baxter Drive
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Attorneys for Defendant NRT, Inc.

Ut^J^

Catherine James
Attorney for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL C. POSNER, an
individual,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

CASE NO.

040901853

Plaintiff,
vs.
EQUITY TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY/
INC., a Utah Corporation;
INDEPENDENCE TITLE INSURANCE
AGENCY/ a Utah Corporation; and
NRT Inc./ a New Jersey
Corporation doing business in
Utah as COLDWELL BANKER
RESIDENTIAL BROKERAGE/
Defendants.

Defendant

:
:
:
:
:

Equity

Title

Insurance

Agency

and

defendant

Independence Title's Motions for Summary Judgment were taken under
advisement by the Court after the submission of Memoranda and oral
argument by counsel. After further consideration and review of all
Memoranda in support, opposition and reply, the Court rules as
follows.
1.

Both defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted

in full as prayed for.

Based upon all of the undisputed material

facts, legal authorities and legal analyses set forth in both
defendants' Memoranda in support and reply incorporated herein by
this reference, the Court finds that plaintiffs' agent,

POSNER V. EQUITY
TITLE INSURANCE

PAGE 2
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Christoffersen, was acting within the scope of her actual implied
and/or

apparent

approval
defendant

of

the

authority
Financial

breached

any

when

she

Guarantee.

duty

owed

to

directions given by plaintiff's agent.

communicated

plaintiff's

Consequently,
plaintiff

by

neither
following

Additionally, defendant

Independence owed plaintiff no duty, its duty is owed to the buyer
as the buyer's escrow agent.
2.

Plaintiff's pending Motion to Compel is now moot.

3.

Counsel for defendants are instructed to submit a joint

Order consistent with this Minute Entry and Rule 7(f), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Dated this >-" day of May, 2CK)5

^TYROKffe E. MEDK
DIS^R/ICT COURT

POSNER V. EQUITY
TITLE INSURANCE

PAGE 3
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this,

day of May,

2005:

Catherine James
Attorney for Plaintiff
5945 Sierra Drive
Mountain Green, Utah 84050
Michael Goldsmith
Attorney for Plaintiff
2697 Cottage Loop
Park City, Utah 84098
David M. Bennion
Attorney for Defendant Equity Title
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
George W. Burbidge II
Attorney for Defendant Independence Title
50 S. Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
David W. Overholt
Robert A. Ponte
Attorneys for Defendant NRT
901 W. Baxter Drive
South Jordan, Utah 84095
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ADDENDUM 2

FINANCIAL GUARANTEE

THIS GUARANTEE is made and entered Into, by and between AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES
CORPORATION, hereinafter called GUARANTOR; and STRACHAN & ASSOCITES, LLC, hereinafter
called BORROWER, for the benefit of MICHAEL C. POSNER, hereinafter called LENDER.
WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, LENDER expects to loan to BORROWER certain assets, namely $260, 000 (two hundred
and sixty thousand dollars), balance of purchase price of a certain property located at 350 Deer Valley
Drive, Park City, Utah., \t) terms of an agreement entered into between Borrower and Lender, dated
August 2*, 2002, hereinafter referred to as the loan, and
WHEREAS, BORROWER desires GUARANTOR to act as GUARANTOR, at BORROWER'S request, to
LENDER, for the amount on the Loan described below; and
WHEREAS, GUARANTOR is willing to act as GUARANTOR subject to the provisions hereof;
NOW THEREFORE, FOR VALUE RECEIVED, including the promises and mutual covenants herein set
forth, BORROWER, LENDER and GUARANTOR do hereby mutually agree as follows:
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
1.

DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of Ihis Guarantee, the terms and phrases listed below shall have only the
meaning shown when used herein;
(a) TheHGUARANTORH means the GUARANTOR whose name appears on the face of
the Guarantee.
(b) The "LENDER" means the LENDER to whom the GUARANTOR is obligated and
whose name appears in this Guarantee, and who makes a loan of securities to the
BORROWER and whose interest in the Loan Instrument is an equitable interest under a
contract or promissory note.
(c) The "BORROWER" means the one stated as BORROWER on the Loan instrument,
whether single or multiple individuals, partnership, corporation or other legal entity.
(d) The "Loan Instrument" means any written evidence of obligation, including a
promissory note, loan agreement, Asset Holder Agreement, or other debt instrument,
obtained from the BORROWER by the LENDER which bears a genuine signature of the
BORROWER and all other parties to the instrument, is complete on its face, and Is valid
and enforceable against the BORROWER.
(e) A "Loss" means the aggregate amount of an unpaid principal and lease fees not to
exceed $260,000 (two hundred and sixty thousand doilars)on the loan instrument plus
interest payments, evidencing an Eligible Loan which is in default notwithstanding
anything to the contrary herein, loss shall exclude penalties of any nature and expenses
of collection, and shall be reduced by any payments made by the GUARANTOR. The
aggregate of all losses under the Guarantee shall in no event exceed the Limit of
Liability stated in the Guarantee.

DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT
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(f) A "Loan" means an advance of funds or securities evidenced by a loan instrument,
the proceeds of which have been or are to be used solely for the project as declared to
the LENDER and the GUARANTOR as set forth above.
(g) The "Eligible Loan" means the total amount due inclusive of finance charges, if any.
The loan shall be evidenced by a written instrument which bears a genuine signature of
the BORROWER as well as all other parties. The Loan shall comply with all Federal,
State, Province, and local rules, statutes and ordinances.
(h) An "Extension" means the permission granted to the LENDER to allow a payment to
be deferred. These deferred payments must be paid before a loan is satisfied.
(i) The "Limit of Liability" means: the principal amount of two hundred and twenty five
thousand dollars ($260,000), plus interest payments, the aggregate amount as stated
shall be the GUARANTOR'S maximum liability under this Guarantee.
(j) The "Application" means any statement and/or presentation, either orally or in writing,
made by the BORROWER, LENDER or their agents, servants or employees, in order to
induce the GUARANTOR to issue this Guarantee.
(k) The "Payment" means a deposit by the BORROWER with the LENDER of funds or
the return of securities which represents the full or partial payment on the Loan
Instrument evidencing an eligible loan,
(I) The "Date of Default" means the earliest date upon which an installment payment was
due which was not paid by ihe BORROWER according to the terms of the Loan
Instrument.
(m) The "Guarantee Period" means from August 28, 2002 to August 2&t 2003, and
renewable annually thereafter for a period not to exceed ten years. In no event shall this
Guarantee be called or loss claimed earlier than September 28, 2002.
2.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO RECOVERY
Each of the following Is a condition precedent to the obligation of the GUARANTOR to
indemnify against a loss hereunder, and each condition must occur prior to any liability or
obligation of the GUARANTOR to cover such loss.
(a) Prior to making a Joan of the securities, the LENDER shall obtain financial
information and representations from the BORROWER. The Lender will do such due
diligence as it, in its sole discretion, deems necessary, which information will be made
available to the Guarantor at the Guarantor's request. The Lender will consider such
credit factors as a prudent person but one who does not routinely enter such
transactions.
(b) If, after the loan is made the LENDER discovers any material misstatements in the
information given by the BORROWER, or misusage of the proceeds of the loan by the
BORROWER, the LENDER shall promptly report such discovery to the GUARANTOR.
(c) All payments received on account of the Loan Instrument, must be applied to the
principal and interest payment due in their order, in the absence of specific written
instructions from the GUARANTOR to do otherwise.

A
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(d) The LENDER shall give written notice of default within thirty (30) days after the event
and submit a claim, if the default is not rectified by the sixtieth (60th) day of default.
3,

EXCLUSIONS
This Guarantee shall not indemnify the LENDER for any reasons other than for the default of the
BORROWER, InclJding but not limited to any loss:
(a) Resuming from the successful assertion of a defense against the LENDER releasing
the BORROWER from the obligation to pay the Eligible Loan, or any judicial order,
government statute, rule or regulation which otherwise extends, modifies or releases the
BORROWER from obligation.
(b) Resulting directly or indirectly from any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of any
officer or employee of the LENDER its successor, assigns or predecessors in interest, or
any other person or business entity acting alone or in collusion with the BORROWER
who is a party to the obligation covered by the GUARANTOR hereunder.
(c) Resulting from forgery,
(d) Resulting from any failure to comply with Federal, State, Province and local rules,
statutes and regulations.

4.

CANCELLATION OF THE GUARANTEE
Cancellation by the LENDER: This Guarantee may be canceled by the LENDER by returning it to
the GUARANTOR or by mailing to the GUARANTOR a written notice of cancellation stating
when, thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. Such cancellation shall not alter or affect
the GUARANTORS obligation with respect to any Claims Notice which was received by it prior to
the cancellation effective date.

5.

NOTICE OF DEFAULT
The LENDER shall as soon as possible, and in no event later than thirty (30) days after the
event, notify the GUARANTOR In writing that payments or interest under the Loan Instrument
are in default. The LENDER shall also send a Notice of Default to the BORROWER and provide
a copy of such notice to the GUARANTOR. Monthly reports indicating the status of the Loan is in
default shall be given to the GUARANTOR thereafter until such Default is secured, an extension
approved, or transfer of equity has been effected,

6.

SUBMISSION OF A CLAIM
In the event that the Loan Instrument is in default for thirty (30) days and the BORROWER, after
notice from the LENDER as required herein, has not made payment to rectify the default, by the
sixtieth (60th) day of default, the LENDER shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, send a notice of
claim to the GUARANTOR. Upon receipt of a Notice of Claim, the GUARANTOR shall take one
of the following actions:
(a) Pay Installments due thereon;
(b) Pay the aggregate amount, less all prior payments by the BORROWER.
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CONVEYANCE OF SECURITY OR COLLATERAL
As an express condition to the settlement of any claim hereunder, the LENDER shall tender to
the GUARANTOR an assignment of the lien, or collateral, within a reasonable period of time
after settlement is made in accordance with the rights of subrogation herein (paragraph 10),
AMOUNT OF LOSS
(a) Within sixty (60) days of a submission of claim, and subject to the provisions of
paragraphs 12 and 13, the GUARANTOR shall pay such claim by paying LENDER
directly.
(b) In any event, the GUARANTOR may elect either to make installment payments in
accordance with the Loan Instrument which \s in default (in which case the
GUARANTOR will, at the time of its first installment payment, make all payments in
default) or unless other agreements are agreed to, or replacement instrument is provided
for with the concurrence to the LENDER, or pay the LENDER the full amount of loss
calculated in accordance with paragraph, 1 (e)
(c) In any event, there shall be no acceleration of the subject Loan Instrument or the
Eligible Loan, if either is subject to acceleration by the terms hereof.
WHERE NOTICE IS GIVEN
All notices, pleadings, claims, tenders and reports and other data required to be given by the
LENDER to the GUARANTOR shall be sent by courier service or registered mail (return receipt
requested) and directed lo the GUARANTOR in care of its Agent of Record as listed,
SUBROGATION
Upon payment of any claim under this Guarantee, the GUARANTOR shall be subrogated to the
LENDER'S rights under the terms of the Loan Instrument and against the BORROWER and any
other party, business entity or organizations liable under the terms of the Defaulted LENDER'S
instrument and against any reserves or holdbacks in the LENDER'S possession. The LENDER
shall execute and deliver at the request of the GUARANTOR all instruments and papers and do
whatever else is necessary to transfer, assign and secure such rights, the execution by the
LENDER of a release or waiver of the right to collect the unpaid amount due on any Loan
Instrument shall equally release the GUARANTOR from any further obligation under this
Guarantee astotheloan Instrument. In the event the Loan Instrument is paid in full, the
GUARANTOR shall be subrogated to the rights of the LENDER under the security and/or
collateral Hen on said security and/or collateral to the extent of claim payments made directly by
the GUARANTOR to the LENDER pursuant to this Guarantee.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
(a) Transfer of interest: Transfer of the BORROWER'S obligations under the Loan
Instrument and of the BORROWER'S interest in any collateral securing such Loan
Instrument shall not be'permitted by the LENDER.
(b) Reports and Examinations of Records: The GUARANTOR may at any time call upon
the LENDER for such reports as it may deem necessary and may inspect any accounts
or records of the LENDER which are applicable lo the Loan Instrument. Such
examination? shall be made during the normal business hours of the LENDER.

k

ETP000020MW

(c) Conformity of Statutes: The terms and conditions of the Guarantee, if any, that are in
conflict with the statutes or laws of the jurisdiction where the Goar^niee is performed are
hereby amended to conform with the minimum requirements of the State of Utah and
Federal statutes of law,
(d) All instruments evidencing or securing or otherwise relating to the Loan must be
satisfactory to the GUARANTOR.
(e) Failure by the BORROWER or the LENDER to satisfy any conditions as set forth
above or elsewhere within this Guarantee, shall relieve the GUARANTOR of any
obligations to perform under this instrument, but in such event, all premiums paid shall
be regarded as earned and shall be retained by GUARANTOR.
(f) GUARANTOR shall be liable to LENDER in accordance with this Guarantee, and
LENDER shall not be required to first exhaust its remedies against BORROWER.
(g) Applicability: The terms and conditions of this Guarantee are to the benefit of and be
binding upon the GUARANTOR and the LENDER, their successors and assigns.
(h) Assignment of This Agreement: In order to assign the Guarantee the LENDER shall
complete a Certificate of Assignment and the GUARANTOR shall consent to assignment
In writing by a duly authorized officer of the GUARANTOR. Consent of assignment shall
not be unreasonably withheld be the GUARANTOR; however, the LENDER may not
assign the Guarantee without the prior written consent of the GUARANTOR and this
Guarantee shall be deemed null and void ff assigned or transferred without the written
consent of the GUARANTOR, whether such transfer be voluntary or involuntary.
(i) Waiver Provision: No Waiver of any condition or covenant of this Guarantee shall be
effective unless in writing and signed by the party against whom said waiver \s asserted
and no failure to exercise and any right or remedy by either the LENDER or the
GUARANTOR shall be considered to imply or constitute a further waiver by such part by
name or any other condition, covenant, right remedy, except as provided herein.
(j) Amendments: Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any agency or by any
other person shall not effect a waiver or change any part of this Guarantee or stop the
GUARANTOR or the LENDER from asserting any right under the terms of the
Guarantee. The terms of this Guarantee may be waived, amended, or changed only
after written approval of the GUARANTOR by its President, or authorized representative,
agent and/or assigns.
(k) Conflict: It is understood and agreed that in the event of a conflict between provisions
of this form and any expression of Intent to cover or any other paper, the provisions of
this form shall apply.
EXPENSES, COMMISSIONS, ETC
BORROWER shall be solely and exclusively responsible for, and shall promptly pay, all fees,
costs and expenses due any agent, broker, attorney, forwarders, finders, or any other party
entitled to receive funds or which may be payable as a result of BORROWER entering into this
Guarantee Agreement.

ETP000021

13.

CONSIDERATION TO GUARANTOR
BORROWER shall pay to GUARANTOR the sum of three thousand nine hundred dollars
($3,900) upon the execution of this FINANCIAL GUARANTEE BOND and shall be fufly earned
and shall be non refundable for any reason including cancellation. Further, as a condition to
GUARANTORS continuing obligation hereunder, BORROWER shall pay to GUARANTOR an
additional one and one half percent (1 V4 %) each year for a period not to exceed a total of ten
(10) years of the unpaid principal balance, or only so long as this Guarantee is required by the
LENDER on or before the fifteenth day prior to the anniyersary of the effective date of this
Guarantee. This Guarantee is null and void ab initio m the event of non payment of any amount
due, when due.

14,

BORROWER'S WARRANTY A3 TO AUTHORIZATION TO ACT
If BORROWER is a corporation, trust or partnership, association or other legal entity, (he
Individual or individuals signing the Guarantee Agreement on BORROWER'S behalf hereby
expressly warrant: (a) that each such person has the full and complete aulhortty> pursuant to
appropriate resolution, or other direction in writing of SORROWER'S Board of Directors,
Trustees, General Manager or Managing Board of Directors who have been fully informed,
concerning this transaction, understand and have approved the provisions of this Guarantee; and
(b) that BORROWER is both in fact and in law, effectively bounded by the provisions of this
Guarantee.

All notices required to be given herein and all correspondence must be sent certified mail, return receipt
requested or by Federal Express to:
LENDER;

Michael C. Posner, c/o The Manager, Caldwell Banker Residential Brokerage, 1750 Park
Avenue, Park City, Utah, 84060

BORROWER: Christopher Strachan: c/o Stephanie Gyllenskog, Allpro, 144 West 100 South, Brigham
City, Utah, 84302
GUARANTOR: Robert V. Murton, President, American Natural Resources Corporation, 10151 Thyme
Circle, South Jordan, Utah. 84095.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THE GUARANTOR has duly executed this Guarantee and endorsement
attached and has caused these presents to be signed by its duly authorized officer on this 3rd day of
August 2002.

(Signed)

President

/<
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ADDENDUM NO,

REALTOR"

TO

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS IS AN 12d ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
an Offer Reference Date of 7-73-D?
including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between
Sr.irAcTi«Ti & A R q n r - f W f ^ T.T.n
as Buyer, and Vnw»r
_ _ as Seller
regarding the Property located at 350 Deer V a l l e y Drive.
_ _
,
._
The
fallowing terms &re hereby incorporated as part of the REPC:
~~~
"
'
""
"
'
Buyer -co provide to teller a Surety Bond for the Sellers Financing; as
per Keal Estare Purchase Contract and all Seller financing addendwng
and all othftr flddpnflmn^ r*

Min r-n-ni-rxnr

on 350 ])i}t*r

V a l l e y T)T-?T7>» r

to be provided before clos-ft^ nf the -pmp+rty.
The closing shall "be on, ;>T before
August 7/ 2002^ 5:00 PM Mottncain Time. All prorations shall stay the same
August 2 2002-

Buyer to pay 6ffSeller financing in full before starting

any construction on property.

t

^

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC. including ail prior addenda
and counteroffers, these terms shall control."Ali other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and Counteroffers, not
modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ ] Seller I>4.Bqyer shall have until
[ ] AM [ ] PM
Mountain Time
to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the
provisions of Section/2S"bf the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set fonh in this ADDENDUM shall lapse.

[ ] Buyer [ \| Seller Signature

Date

Time

[ ] Buyer[ ] Seller Signature

Date

Time

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTgROFFEJR/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
£><1 ACCEPTANCE: [
[

]

COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO,

(Signature)
[ ]

] S e l l e r X ^ B u y e r hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM.

REJECTION:

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

((Signature)

(D&te)

-(Time)

(Date)

(Time)

.

[ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17,1998. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.
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UAR Form 2

vu

ADDENDUM 5

aUG-22:2DD2 THU 07;02 Pfl

P, 02

FAX HO, BOitedDBBB

nL-PRO REALTY GROUP

r^c^ji

_,iir, 1

ADDENDUM NO. 8
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE: CONTRACT
7H)£ IS AM [ X ] ADDENDUM [ ] CttUNTISROFFER to that RCAt ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT ftha T^HPO-) with an Offer
flkfarerjce Date of JUfy 23. 2002
.
fncIUc^ng all priorftoWefldaand counteroffers,fcaWtaoriSirachgn &
Associates LLC
,
& iJuyw, and Mfcfiaat Fosner
_ as Seller, rogarding the
Property laaaied at 350 Pear_Ve|<lev D y
The;/oll6w!qg tarma are
teneby incarpotetsd as pan afroe REPO;

1. Buyer wlff (hcrEsree Surety Bond la carer new a^gjjqtrSelta^H carryi
2. RatefeIncreased to 10%.
3. Buyer will give Selfera check in tha ^mountof?1t1oaoo, toayverte^oft^tyng^agfbriandl
belpfl purchased.
/
4, All other items on contract to remain tfKsflms.

r

To the extent tlw tefftts of thfe ADDENDUM modify or conflict wllh any provisions of the RfePC, including all prior addenda and
aaunfaroffers, Iheso terms ahq)[ control /'ill otter terms of the REPC, Including ill) p/far afc&nda andtfaunlBi'offers,nal modified by this
ADDENDUMflhaHramaJfl th&same. EX j SaNar [ 1 mty*r shall have until 5!0fl _ £ J AM [ X ) PM Mountain Tlmo on_
.(Dale), to p ^ - r * ihe terms of tftte ADDENDUM irt scairdortca With tha provisions o| Section 23 of the REPC.
Unless so accepted, the after aa set forth In thta ADDENDUM »hfli! l&pse.

^

% >7^<D7L

<d.

[or"Signature

(Date)

<7ime)

1:^0AV
'

[ ] Puycr [ J Seller SlgnalUre

(Date)

flfme)

(Dale)

(Time)

(D*te)

(Time)

AODEPtANCE/CX)UKT6RO FFElVF I EJECTION
CHJ3CK ONE:
IJJJ^ACCfiFTANCE: I 3 Salter [ ] Buyar horoby accepts tha termc pf thin ADDENDUM.
t J CQU
(Sigria«|4rBj

iJFFER: [ ] Sellar [ ] Eiuyar presenters a counteroffer the twins of attached ADpENDUM NO,
'"

"$Ste)

fTVh*)

(SignalLire)

£ 3 felEJElJfiON: [ ] Seller t JBuyHr -ejeote toe foregoing A D D ^ U M ,
(Signature)

(CiateJ

(Time)

(Signature)

THIS taHMAmiOVEttjaY THE UTAH RE^^

EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17, 1HML IT fiEFFACES AND SUPfiflSEOES AIL pHE\10Usf_Y APPROVED VE&eJO^G CPTHI3 FORM,
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for Title lroui anca as agreed to by Buyer under Section 8. Buyer also agrees to lake the Properly atofoct lo existing leasts
affecting, the Property and net expiring prior lo Claang. 8uyer Agree* lo be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowner*
association dues, utilities, and other services provided to the Property a/ref Closing. Except for any loan(«) specifically
assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1(c), Seller will oauae to be paid on by Closing ell mortgages, trust dcocs, judgments,
mechanic's hem. tax liens and warrants. Seller will cause lo be paid eunent by Closing ail assessments and homeowner*
association du*&.
10.2 Condition of Properly, S^ler warrants that Ite Property wi II born thdtollowfnooond»lion ON THE DATE SELLER
DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER:
(n) the Property shall ba broom-dean and free 0/ ctebns and pergonal belongings. Any Setter or tenant moviivj-rBlaied
damaje to the Property shad be repaired al Salter's expense;
(b} tho heaBna cooiin$j4 electrical, friumWng and iprinKler system* and fixtures, and tha appliances and fireplace* VM'R bo
in working oruer and nt for their Intended purposes.
(e) the roof and foundation shall be free of leak* known to Sailer;
(d; any private well Of septic tank serving Ihe Property shall have applicable permit, and shell DO in wwkino order and
lit for it* intended purpose; and
I the Property and Improvero >nt$, including the landscaping, wW be in tfr* same general condition **(hoy wore on me
W of Acceptance.
11. WALK-THROUGH IN$PECT)OM Before Settlement, ftjyer m*y, Upon reft*x\abfe notice end at a reasonable time,
conduct a ^*alkthrough• Inapecion of the Prcperty K> determine only that the Property is "a* represented," meaning that the
Hems refarenotd in Sections 1.1,8.4 and 10 2 f 'the Items'') are n>*pctVety prt*&nt, mpoirtd/cnangftd ac agrood and in tho
warrant** condition. If the lt*m$ a n not as represented, 6eH*r * t i prior lo-Settlement, replace, correct or repair the items
or, with the oonserrt of Buyer (and Under K applicable), ascrow an amount at Srttament to provide for the samo Th$ failure
to ocrxHKiaNveJk'thrtxjdi inspedioa OJ to d i m that an Hem Is not at reprwnted, ah*Jl not constitute a waiver by Buyer of
therightlo rtoeJve, on me data of possession, the items as represented.
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Srflar agree* that from the dafct of Acceptance until tfw date of Ck^lng, none of
the Mowing shall ocour without the pnor written conaettt of Buyer: (a) no changes In arty exiting leax>s strati bero*d«;(b)
rw now J e a ^ shaft be entered Into; ^
und <d) no further financial encumbriwe* to the Property shaH be made,
15. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyaror Seller is a corporation, partnti^ip, tws^ esUt*, I J m ^
entity, tho pmon executing tWa Contact on its behalf warranto his or har authority 10 do 50 and to bind Buyer and Seller.
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. Thia Contract together with Its addenda, any attached exhibit*, and Seller Disclosures,
conaliJutes the entire Contract betvwrn the parties and supersede* aod mptocea any and u prior neootiaiioaj, copx&Qrtations,
warrantee, understandings or centred* between the parties. Thla Contract cannot be chinked excopt by writ:en agreement
Of the parties.

S

15- DEPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties aflree that any dapue. nt&ria pKor to or after Cloairx). reined to tHt Contrect
« X W A 1 L I J UAY (upon mutual agreement df (he parties) firrt befiubmtt&KJJto modiatioa. If the p4rtie« aoroo lo mediation,
fteobpUa stall be submitted to madation through a mediation provider mutuafly agreed-upon by the pcmios. Each party
n&tv& \o bear ite own cotts of m^dlaBoa If mediation faBar tfie other procedure and remedies avaJabl* u»^or thia Central
ahaff apply- Nothing In thla Section 15 shall prohibit any pany from aeeWng emergency equitable relief pending modialioa
15. DEFAULT. If Suyw defaul?5, StUr may elect either 10 retain the Earnest Money Dsposfi ax liquidated damage, or to
return It and *ue Buyer lo specifically enforce thk Contraci or pursue other remadfet available at tew. If Soflor default, hi
adtfkjon K) return of the Earnest Money Deporii, Buyer may el^ct vitiw to aocept from Seller a sum e^ual !o the Earnest
Money Deposit ^s llquldaled damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce tK$ Contract or pursue other remtdfes
avaJJabfe at law. If Buyer elects ro accept liquidated damages, Seller agre^ to pay the ffoufdaiad damogos lo Buyer upon
demand* It * egresd thai dental of a Loan Application made by the Buyerfenot a default and 13 ©ovamcrf by SocWon 2 3(b).
17. ATTORNEY FEJES AWD COSTS., In the event of litiflAlfon or bindno arbtlTatfen lo enforce tM Contract, the jwvwllng
^^^S^1 itff
rSi 00813 mi nmotab^
^^^^y f e w Hcwev#r, attwroy fees shall not bo a w d o d for penkipalion in
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